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This paper shows new ways to discriminate between regression models. The most 
appealing aspect is that the criteria come from all possible prediction 
exercises one can imagine, but may be computed directly from the residual sums 
of squares. The computational clue is the Binet-Cauchy theorem from linear 
algebra, whlch points the way to new possibilities, encompassing several 
recent proposals. The context is Bayesian with noninformative priors, but the 
basic results are also of interest from a Classical viewpoint. The use of 
predictions allows to derive Bayes Factors circumventing the problem that 
noninformative priors lead to probability statements of incomparable 
dimensions. These Bayes Factors perform well in simulation studies, but a 
number of questions remains. 
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1. An informal summary. 
This paper shows new ways to discriminate between regression models. The most 
appealing aspect is that the criteria come from all possible prediction 
exercises one can imagine, but may be computed directly from the residual sums 
of squares. The computational clue is the Binet-Cauchy theorem from linear 
algebra, which points the way to new possibilities, encompassing several 
recent proposals. The context is Bayesian with noninformative priors, but the 
basic results are also of interest from a Classical viewpoint. The use of 
predictions allows to derive Bayes Factors circumventing the problem that 
noninformative priors lead to probability statements of incomparable 
dimensions. These Bayes Factors perform well in simulation studies, but a 
number of questions remains. 
That real prediction errors should provide the clue in discriminating between 
models is a widely held belief. An often used classical procedure is to 
discard part of the data in estimation, and to use these data for a forecast 
exercise. In Bayesian inference with improper priors, predictive likelihoods 
are the main clue in providing Bayes Factors, needed to update prior beliefs 
in models. The drawback of all these methods is that they depend strongly on 
the choice of starting values; they only use one possibility and thus are 
inefficiënt. This paper shows the way to combine all possibilities to 
predict (n-m) values from m starting values into one criterion. Moreover, it 
appears to be possible to combine these in such a way that the only thing one 
has to do (with an approximation that depends on the X matrices, but works 
very well in most cases) is to perform the two regressions. The result is 
invariably of the format of a likelihood ratio 
p(y|M ) '~2 ^ ( n " k ) / 2 
•=c(n,k,r,m). 
p(ylMx) 
s 
_ 0 
2 S 1 
2 
with the s the "unbiased" estimate of the residual variance in both models, k 
the number of parameters in the largest model (M ) and k-r in the smaller 
model (M ). Whether the models are nested is irrelevant. 
o 
The constant c comes from the prediction errors, combined using the 
Binet-Cauchy theorem. A plausible though somewhat heuristic procedure is used 
to evaluate sets of forecast errors based on mak starting values; for each 
value of m, it becomes apparent that the complete set of forecast errors 
contains all relevant information, but the resulting values for c differ. This 
reveals some indeterminacy in the constant, which serves like a penalty for 
the use of parameters like in the criteria of Schwarz and Akaike. Using the 
smallest possible value for m, m=k, gives a criterion close to Schwarz' s, 
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using large values results in lower penalties for the use of parameters. Using 
the likelihood ratio as Bayes factor to update prior beliefs, this 
indeterminacy is enlarged by the difficulty to define prior odds for the 
models (though unit odds seem fair). 
Despite these indeterminacies, a simulation study mimicking realistic 
situations with both models having equal prior probabilities, shows that 
interpretation of the likelihood ratio as a Bayes factor yields good results. 
The choice between nonnested models of equal dimension (then c=l), is in most 
cases easy, the criterion favoring one of the models strongly. Nonnested 
models of different dimension also give straight answers in most cases. For 
nested models, the risk of an error of the second kind (rejecting the large 
model while it is right) is in many cases very small; by using high penalties 
(m=k) errors of both kinds become small. But in cases where the large model is 
very close to the small model, lower penalties (m=n-l) give better results by 
keeping the error of the second kind low. Thus the possibility to use several 
values for m brings back the familiar uncertainty of model choice for nested 
models with unspecified priors for the parameters extending the small model. 
However, new arguments for the choice of the proper criterion are involved in 
the derivations, and it may well be that the simulation study does not reflect 
the proper arguments. 
Anyhow, despite the questions that remain, a useful tooi arises from the 
algebra in this paper. New, computationally simple criteria with new 
interpretations are the result, and neither priors on parameters nor 
asymptotic arguments are involved. 
The setup is as follows: section 2 t rea ts model choice with a fixed set of 
starting values in general, section 3 the case of the regression model. 
Section 4 considers the fact that predictive likelihoods are contained in the 
degenerate distribution of regression residuals. Some consequences of the 
Binet-Cauchy theorem are derived in section 5, and used in section 6 to 
combine predictive densities for different starting values into one criterion. 
In section 7 the outcomes for minimal training samples (sets of starting 
values, size m=k) are derived, in section 8 training samples of m>k, and in 
section 9 the largest possible size (m=n-l). Section 10 shows that consistent 
updating formulae result. Section 11 gives the results of the simulation 
studies. Their are no separate conclusions apart from those mentioned above. 
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2. Model choice the Bayesian way and predict ive likelihoods. 
Let be 
M | e the models being considered, 
IÏ(M ); n(e |M ) the prior probabilities, 
l i l v? 
y the data. 
For two models M and M 
o 1 
P(MQ |y) n(MQ) p(y|MQ) ir(Mo) S p(y|eo ,Mo)ir(eo |Mo) 
PCMJy) = nMJ ptylMj) = n lM^ S p C y i e ^ M j W e j I I ^ ' ( 1 ) 
or: posterior odds is prior odds times Bayes factor. 
With proper priors, the posterior odds give an elegant answer to a well 
defined question. And by analyzing these answers for different priors, it 
becomes apparent that the Bayes factor has many attractive features. The 
direct interpretation as relative evidence for both hypotheses avoids 
classical misunderstandings as does the robustness with respect to the meaning 
of sharp null hypotheses (see Berger and Delampady(1987) for a good summary of 
these arguments). 
One may wonder, however, whether this is the question one wants to answer 
(Leamer 1978). If one really thinks of the models as two possible "true" 
descriptions of reality, and has prior ideas about both chances, it is the 
valid answer. But, once one has proper prior ideas, Bayesian inference allows 
to formulate, depending on the nature of the research.a decision function (one 
may wish simplification, plausibility, an argument for further research, or a 
real decision), all giving different answers. The Standard problems of model 
choice and hypothesis testing, for which Bayesians advocate Bayes Factors are 
typically activities performed in the absence of sufficiënt prior information. 
Leamer (1992) has pointed the way to simplify the prior information needed by 
deriving elicitation diagnostics, and this may provide a solution in some 
cases, but it remains in most econometrie models an almost impossible task and 
most researchers will feel more confident in using Jeffreys' (1961) 
noninformative priors. 
However, this concept leads to serious trouble in model comparison, see, e.g. 
Leamer (1978, section 4.5), who shows that totally different answers arise for 
different concepts of noninformativeness. The Standard answer - fitting nicely 
in the predictive context we will use is simple: the model with more 
parameters simply gets a posterior probability of zero. The essence of this 
result is that noninformative priors for models with a different number of 
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parameters lead to probability statements of different dimensions. 
Leamer suggests a solution, based on a stationarity assumption for explanatory 
variables and asymptotic expansions, but the result is not very convincing. 
Some further reflection (see 0'Hagan(1993) for an extensive discussion) shows 
that there can be no solution within the Standard setup. The Bayes factor is 
an essentially non-robust concept, in the sense that the outcome of the 
analysis depends heavily on the prior assumptions, and that this dependency 
does not vanish asymptotically. 
In the likelihood context, the most popular Bayesian criterion comes from 
Schwarz(1978): a penalty of ln(n)/2 per parameter in the loglikelihood. This 
result rests even more heavily on assumptions and asymptotic expansions. 
All these problems seem to vanish when looking at predictive densities. A 
"training set" of m observations is used to get rid of the indeterminacy of 
the probability statements and the comparison is based on predictions. This 
may be done recursively, like in the Kalman filter. Phillips and Ploberger 
(1992) consider this as the essential mechanism in obtaining Bayes factors. 
Starting with the first k observations, one may evaluate 
p ' W v V - p ' W v ^ pfrA-^i* (2) 
for both models. This leads to an intuitively attractive procedure. Each 
observation provides an update of the Bayes factor, which is multiplied by the 
rat io of the probabilities both models did assign to the realization. 
Typically one s ta r t s with unit odds and the better predicting model wins. The 
dilemma of comparing models of different dimension is directly clear in this 
setup: if one takes for k the number of parameters in the small model, this 
model makes a well defined prediction for observation k+1, while the larger 
model can't , leading to a zero score for this model. 
The problem in using (2) is the dependency on the choice of the set k. Three 
solutions are proposed. Berger and Pericchi (1993) suppose to use all possible 
starting sets and averaging the score in some way. This is essentially the 
same solution as proposed in section 7 of this paper, though our approach 
involves a ra ther special type of averaging. O'Hagan (1993) supposes to use a 
larger training set than the minimal one. This is less efficiënt, but in 
section 8 we show that combination with the idea to use all possible starting 
sets is possible. Phillips and Ploberger (1992) do not use the idea of equal 
sets of start ing values directly; they use the complete likelihood in both 
models and use the Radon Nykodym derivative which appears to have properties 
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that avoid the problem of different dimension. The high level of abstraction 
in their derivation makes this seem magie, but our more down to earth section 
4 suggests that such a solution may be justified. For the time being, however, 
our analysis of the Standard regression model suggests that more clarity is 
needed about the question we want to answer. 
3. The regression model with <r known 
For the Standard regression model with tr known, the result of (2) may be 
calculated directly using Bayes' rule. This takes care of the switch between 
parameters and data in an elegant way (notation: y is the vector of y 
values excluding k): 
p^n-JV = Jp (yn_k!yk^ ) p ( p lyk ) d p = Jp^n-jPwelV* (3) 
by definition this is equal to (2). As 
P|y„ =N(b,<r2lX 'X]"1) (4) 
' k k k k 
with b =[X 'X ]_1X 'y , 
k k k k V 
pO I v ) « | X ' X J °-5(27r)"(k"r) /V(k"r)exp<-0.5[O-b )'[X 'X ](0-b )]/<r2} (4a) 1
 k k k k k k k 
This is a well defined probability distribution, provided X 'X is not 
singular (as is the case for k smaller than the number of regression 
parameters). Working out (3) gives (we use a=^2n) 
p(y „ I y„,<r) = I X'X | "°-51X 'X I °-5(o«r)"(n"k)exp<-0.5(C- B'A_1B)/<r2} (6) 
n - k ' k k k 
with 
C -B'A-1B = y 'y + b '[X 'X ]b y'X[X'X]-1X'y (6a) 
n-k n-k k k k k 
We first consider the term (6a). If X is of f uil rank, the second term is 
k 
y 'y , and (6a) becomes the familiar expression for the residual sum of 
squares: y'My, with M = I - X[X'X]" X'. Note that this expression is symmetrie 
in the observations, despite the asymmetrie probability statement. 
If X is k*p, with p the number of parameters (k>p), (6a) is not a Standard 
residual sum of squares; it may be written as 
C- B'A"XB = y'My - (v 'y, - b ' I X ' X j b ) 
k k k k k k 
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= y'My - yk 'Mkyk 
= RSS - RSS 
(7) 
where RSS is the total residual sum of squares and RSS the residual sum of 
squares obtained from the regression with the p regressors on the first k 
observations (so RSS =0 if k=p). 
This suggests a simple direct comparison of models. One takes for k the number 
of parameters in the large model, and compares the total RSS in the model with 
parameters k with the adjusted sum of squares RSS - RSS in the smaller model. 
Evaluating the probability statements at the resulting maximum likelihood 
estimates of the <r's (for large n a good approximation of thé final purely 
Bayesian result, which we will t reat later on) 
<r = (RSS - RSS )/(n-k) 1 1 ik (8) 
i referring to model i, we get the result: 
0.5, p(y ly ,M ) p(y ly ,M <r ) IX 'X | IX 'X \ v 
r
 •'n-k'-V 0 „ K - n - k ' - V 0 0 0 0 Ok Ok ( 
,0 .5* -(n-k) T0 
, -0 .5, #J„+\\.*J P ^ l v - t ^ > 'V x i '~ ü ' ° IVV'V*"" 
(9) 
Unfortunately the outcome depends heavily upon the choice of starting values. 
An extreme example is when one of the X 'X matrices happens to be singular: 
the corresponding model gets zero probability. Moreover the choice of k is 
rather arbitrary. So the next task is to get rid of the choice of starting 
values and to decide on the optimal value of k. But f irst we have a closer 
look at the concept of predictive densities. 
4. The direct l ink between predictive likelihoods and residuals 
The preoccupation with predictive densities is put in another perspective if 
we look at the distribution of the residual vector. This is an n-p dimensional 
singular normal distribution, proportional to 
( ao>)-(n-p) e-0.5{y'My/«r2> 
Writing 
M = 
M M 
11 21 
M M 
12 22 
and y = (10) 
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the indices 1 and 2 referring to partitions of size m and (n-m) respectively, 
it is easily deduced (see appendix A) that 
y>My . y'My = y ^ + 2 ^ ' M ^ + y ^ M ^ (11) 
and thus that (10) corresponds with a distribution of y |y which is n-m 
dimensional normal, with variance M" and expectation - M~ M y , multiplied by 
a factor 
exp(-0.5<y'[M - M M_1M ]y /er2}) = exp(-0.5{RSS /<r2}). (12) 
1 11 12 22 2 1 1 
As moreover (see again appendix A) 
IX 'X I/IX'XI = |M ! (13) 
m m 22 
we conclude that 
p2(y) = p2(y2ly1) ü4) 
in other words: 
p (y) = c p(y |y ). (14a) 
n-m m n-m m 
This shows that all possible predictive likelihoods may directly be derived 
from the density of the vector of residuals. This leads to two points. 
First , the different probability statements arising for different starting 
values appear to be only different ways to look a t the same distribution. Note 
that even in making a probability statement on one model, the statements based 
on m start ing values, which all depend on y by y'My, depend on the choice of 
starting values by the X 'X matrices. Different predictive probabilities thus 
m m 
may be essentially equal. In other words: to compare predictive probabilities, 
one must convert them to the same base. 
Second, it must be possible to combine predictive probabilities to get some 
unique number. Every set of predictive probabilities containing all 
information should then lead to the same probability statement if converted to 
the same base. 
In the next section we show how such a combination may be performed, such that 
the choice of starting set drops out in a plausible way. 
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5. The Binet-Cauchy theorem 
The theorem of Binet-Cauchy says: 
if A and B are m*n and n*m matrices, respectively, msn, then 
IAB| = T |A B Lwith A and B corresponding m*m submatrices of A and B, 
and the summation being over all possible sets {k}. 
We only need symmetrical expressions of the form |A'A| « Z,k»lA'A |. For A=X, 
the theorem says 
^<k€n> k k 
For the selections of size m, when the rank of X is p, we may apply the 
theorem again in the form 
'
x
'
x
 I "E,
 c J x ' x I 
m m ^{p€m} p p 
implying that all X'X matrices are selected n m / n = n ~ P times, so p P l.mJ [PJ \p) l.n»-Pj 
T JX'X | = [°"P]L
 C J X ' X I = [""ïllX'XI. (15) 
(m6n) n» m ^ m - p j ^ p e n ) p p ^m-pj 
For A = [X y], Binet-Cauchy is applicable to selections of size m+1 and 
iX'Xly'My = T IX' X )y' M y* 
J J
 ^{m+l€n> m+1 m+1 J m+1 m+rw m+1 
For X with rank p<m, we must convert the theorem to p+1 dimensional matrices. 
With a similar argument as bef ore we get for selections of size m 
T J X ' X |y'M y* = f""P"j] |X'X|y'My. (16) 
<m) m m m m m i m - p - l j 
6. The combination of predictions f rom all possible starting sets 
Suppose we consider for a model with p parameters training samples of size 
m^p. We then have I possibilities of choosing a starting set. The predictive 
densities are 
p(y ly ,<r) = (ocrf^YlX'Xl / lX'X D^exp^O.Sly'My-y'M y ]/<r2} (17) 
n—m m m m m m m 
The Binet-Cauchy theorem provides clues for the combination of these 
densities. In fact we think that the theorem is so powerful and suited for the 
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problem that it must show the way to combine the densities. However, despite 
intensive t r ia ls , we only partially succeeded in finding the clue. 
The only way that leads to comprehensive results is a linear combination of 
the exponential term. First consider weights 
c 
m 
= |X'X l l ^ ' P l ^ l X ' X f 1 (18) 
i m m ^m-pl 
(16) implying that F c = 1. The consequence is 
vm> m 
^ . v ^ - * : v : ] • ** - (mip)"1^!) » * • ^ ? - *••» «9) 
so, instead of different residual sums of squares, each time adjusted for the 
residual sum of squares in the starting values, this weighted sum is 
independent from the starting set and adjusts the overall n-p dimensional RSS 
according to the difference in dimension using m starting values. 
Substituting (19) into (17) learns 
£ c lnp(y ly ,<r) = 
"{m> m n-m1 m 
- (n-m)ln(ear) + 0.5Y c ln( |X'X | / | X ' X | ) -0.5[ - " ^ L y'My]/<r2 (20) 
"(m) m m m n - p 
The first interesting thing about this expression is that it provides a valid 
n-m dimensional expression for p(y), symmetrical in y. "Valid" in the view of 
the "mixing lemma": 
p(M]y,R) = £g p(M|S,y,[R])p(S|y,R) (21) 
where R is a dimension reduction procedure, to obtain a proper probability 
statement, S is the set of values chosen by R and p(M|S,y,[R]) = p(M|y,S) is 
the probability statement we get by taking the starting values set S ((l..m) 
in our example). 
So, to get a proper statement we must define p(S|y,R), in other words a 
procedure which selects S, possibly depending on y, and possibly taking 
several sets of starting values with probabilities (or weights) summing to 
one. 
As our weighted geometrie average between the possible predictive probability 
statements, with weights summing to unity, always lies between the Iowest and 
the highest one, it is equal to some arithmetic average of the probabilities, 
and thus equal to the expected probability in some process selecting sets of 
starting values with probabilities summing to one. 
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The second interesting outcome is the maximum likelihood estimator for <r 
based on the "mean predictive likelihood" (20): 
o-2= y'My/(n-p)= s 2 (22) 
the classic unbiased estimator, independent of the size of m. 
However, it remains to be seen whether all information from the forecasts is 
used efficiently by taking a weighted geometrie average. The different 
(vector) forecasts contain to some degree independent information, and 
independent information leads to multiplication of probability statements. 
Completely independent log-probability statements, - the extreme case - may 
simply be added, so the weights sum to n. In our case, we know that n-p 
independent probability statements may be obtained from y'My. This dimension 
may be obtained by using weights 
d =|i£c = ix«x ifrrll^ix'xr1 
m n-m m m m ^m-p-lj 
which gives 
Y .d lnp(y ly ,<r) = 
"(m) m n-m' m 
c - (n-p)lno- + 0.5Y, d ln( |X'X | / iX 'X | ) -0.5[y'My]/<r2 (23) 
^{m) m m m 
which proves that , for any size m^p of the training sample, it is possible to 
reproduce, up to a factor depending on X, the distribution of the residual sum 
of squares. We conclude from this fact, in view of section 4, that this is the 
proper way to combine predictions. The only problem is the rather artificial 
base for the predictive density. 
2 
Note that now for inference on <r , the sets of forecasts always provide the 
same posterior, which is also equal to the posterior based on the concentrated 
likelihood. This once more confirms that our way to combine predictions is the 
optimal one. 
7. Bayes factors for minimal training samples of equal size 
First we explore the weighted geometrie mean of predictive probability 
statements of maximal dimension (23). This is interesting as it provides 
useful insights and as it is a variant upon a proposal by Berger and Pericchi 
(1993), who suggests to average all possible Bayes factors. 
With k we denote the higher number of regression parameters, with k-r the 
lower number, such that in the case of nested models r is the number of 
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restrictions. The "mixture" (19) then becomes 
n-k E{k>ck[y'My - y;Mky;] - -fifcr y»My (24) 
Substituting (24) into (17) learns 
^{k>Ck l n p ( yn-klyk , ( r ) = - ( n - W l n a + 
n-k 
- (n-k)lntr + 0.5£{ k )ck ln( |X^Xk l / |X'X|) -0.5[ n _ ^ _ r ) y'My]/<r ) (25) 
evaluating this for the ML estimate for <r from (20) we get 
ln(p (y)) s -(n-k)lna -(n-k)ln(r +0.5£„ .c,ln(|X'X | / | X ' X | ) -0.5(n-k) (26) 
n-k "(k) k k k 
In appendix B it is explained that 
^ k > C k l n ( | X k X k | / | X ' X | ) = l n f n " k + r l + l c lnc (k) k k (27) 
approximately equals 
KTMï) + c (27a) 
The last expression, with c being a small constant with slight variation among 
models is explained in appendix B. Assuming that the approximation holds, we 
get from (26) a simple formula for what we may call the mean predictive 
density: 
ln(p (y)) s e * - (n-kJln^ + 0.51n ( ( n " k " " r ) t - ^ - 1 
n-k V r n' ) 
with c =-(n-k)lna -(n-k)/2 +c about equal among models. 
The corresponding Bayes factor becomes 
(28) 
p(yr J H J 
p(y, 
n-k' o fn-k+r] 
. I H ) l r J 
1/2 
n-k • 1 
0 
2 
-<n-k)/2 
(29) 
where we use p to denote the aspect that maximum likelihood estimates for <r 
are used. 
The main part looks like a residual variance criterion. Theil (1971, p543) 
2 
shows that the expectation of s is lowest for the correct model. In terms of 
the rat io of residual sums of squares the criterion may be written 
12 
**nJV 
p (y„-JH i ) 
_o
 m (n-k+rï 
l r J 
1/2 
n-k 
n-k+r 
-(n-k)/2 fRSS 1 o 
RSS 
-(n-k)/2 
(30) 
note that in asymptotic criteria like Schwarz's the RSS ratio occurs without 
adjustment for degrees of freedom and to the power n instead of n-k. In both 
respect our criterion seems more plausible. 
fn— k+r^ Noting that our "dimension penalty" for the loglikelihood is 0.5 In s 
r / 2 ln(n-k) - 1/2 ln(r!), we see another difference with Schwarz' criterion: 
apart from using n-k instead of n again, the factor - 1/2 ln(r!) means higher 
penalties for more restrictions. Putting all differences together, and using 
the approximation 
(n-k+r J 
-<n-k)/2 
se 
r / 2 
our criterion may be written as 
p(y
»-JHoï In ^ — - — -m r / 2 ln(n-k) -l/21n(r!)+r/2 -(n-k)/21n fRSS 1 o 
RSS 
(31) 
the difference with Schwarz is, apart from using n-k (which has obvious 
appeal), the factor r / 2 - l/21n(r!). Numerical values for this factor are 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0.50 .65 .60 .41 .11 - . 29 - .76 -1 .30 -1.90 -2 .55 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
-3.25-3.99-4.78-5.60-6.45-7.34-8.25 -9.20-10.17 -11.17 
So we see that the penalty for the larger dimensional model quite close to 
Schwarz's for r<8. For large r our penalty is lower. 
8. Optimizing the size of the t ra in ing sample(s) 
The reason to use minimal training sets is to use as much of the data as 
possible for evaluation. There is a good reason however to consider larger 
training sets: small training samples put an unfair large penalty upon high 
dimensional models, the uncertainty about parameter estimates being huge. For 
this reason 0'Hagan (1993) suggests "moderate" training sets (without saying 
how moderate). This argument seems to lose much of its value once one uses all 
possible starting sets by the Binet-Cauchy mixing, but the dimension of the 
criterion still remains that of a probability statement on n-k values 
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conditional upon k values. And, as will become clear, there are possibilities 
to use larger training sets leading to lower penalties for large models. 
Consider training samples of size m, and two models M and M with k-r (=p ) 
and k (=p ) parameters respectively, the Bayes factor (29) changes into 
p(y | H J ( ^wzfn A-i/2 
p(y 
f |H ) ( \l/2f v 
"••n1 0 ~ [ n ~ P 0 | | n ~ P i | 
r IH) ~^- p oJ ^J 
2 \ -(n-m)/2 S 
_ 0 
2 S 1 
(32) 
which shows that, in increasing m, we lose power in the part representing the 
2 2 
fit (the ratio s / s ), but decrease the penalty function for the dimension. 
All as expected. Considering that it is unfair to the larger model to compare 
on the base of small training samples (the relevant training sample has size 
n), this gives rise to another Bayes factor, less unfair than that based on 
training sample k. We simply minimize (32) with respect to m, so choose the 
Bayes factor as favorable as possible for the larger model. In this procedure 
2 2 
the ratio s / s is fixed, but this is valid in view of the mixing lemma of 
section 5. 
2 2 
This procedure makes sense for the ratio s / s larger than 1, so the large 
model having the better fit. For values near 1, the result is m=n-l, and the 
Bayes factor is about 1. The larger the ratio, the smaller values for m 
result, but always "reasonable" values (like O'Hagan proposes), much larger 
than k. For moderate rat io 's the increase in the Bayes factor is spectacular, 
as the following table shows: 
Table 1 n = 50, p = 7 
* i 2 , 2 /s 
1 0 
p = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.80 35 31 27 23 19 15 11 
0.85 46 41 35 29 29 18 12 
0.90 49 49 49 43 34 25 16 
0.95 49 49 49 49 49 44 26 
1.00 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
for other values of k and r similar results arise (r, the difference in 
dimension, being the decisive factor, different values for k hardly matter. 
2 
We also computed the table for the Bayes factor, integrating <r out for both 
2 - 2 
models with respect to the noninformative prior n(<r ) « tr (assuming the 
proportionality constants equal, which seems the only fair option). Then, (32) 
changes into 
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-, . . . , f 2 N-(n-m-l)/2 
p(y H )
 f x l / 2 / x-1/2 ~ A """' ° ~fn-po) fn_Pi] 
p(y |H ) K V K P J 
s 
_ 0 
2 S 1 
(33) 
which only differs slightly from (32). The outcomes for the criterion become 
TabIe 2 n = 50, p = 7 
2 . 2 
Vs' 
1 0 
p = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0.80 35 31 26 23 19 15 11 
0.85 46 40 35 29 24 18 12 
0.90 49 49 49 43 34 25 16 
0.95 49 49 49 49 49 45 25 
1.00 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
indeed only slightly different from table 1 
Obviously we are making progress towards a fair comparison, as far as we 
believe in the arguments to do so. Still, in this view the Bayes factor for 
better fitting large models must be to low, as the relevant "training set" is 
n, much larger than m. Moreover the methodology is unsatisfactory for the case 
the smaller model fits better: the argument then leads to m=n-l, throwing away 
almost all the evidence. What one actually wants is a procedure that uses 
large training samples, without throwing the evidence from the fit away. Such 
a procedure exists, as the sequel will show. 
9. Probability statements of maximal equal dimensions 
In section 6 we showed that using Binet-Cauchy weights for the log- predictive 
probabilities with weights summing to more than unity, may reproduce all 
available information. However, combining of all information available in the 
forecasts for both models leads to the problem we started with: probability 
statements of incomparable dimension. This problem may be met by using weights 
&£!)•'»" e = - 2 ^ c » |X'X | | n " p ~ [ r 1 | X , X f 1 (34) m n-m m m m ~ 
and thus 
T e lnp(y ly ,<r) = -(n-k)lna + 
<m> m n-m' m . 
- (n-k)ln«r + 0.5V e ln(|X'X |/|X*X|) -0.5-^[y'Myl/o* (35) 
^{m> m m m n-p 
which looks like a probability statement of dimension n-k (in the next section 
we will show that it may be considered as such). So, we may construct 
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probability statements of maximal equal dimension. The choice of m in this 
context only reflects the choice of the base, and we may do this to maximize 
the fairness with respect to the largest model by putting m=n-l, i.e. 
= (n-k) c = IX'X | ^ " P - j l ^ l x ' X l - 1 . and 
m m m ^m-p-lj 
(36) 
T ,e lnp(y ly ,<r) = -(n-k)lna + 
lm > m n-m' m 
- (n-k)lno- + O.ST e ln( |X'X | / | X ' X | ) -0.5-^[y'Uy)/<r2 
^{m) m m m n - p (37) 
resulting in the "Fair Bayes Factor" 
p(y |H ) 
n-m' 0
 M 
r > 
n-pQ 
(n-k)/2 fs2 
0 
P ( y»-JH l ) n — m' 1 n-P» . 
2 
x -(n-k)/2 
(38) 
10. Consistent updating 
The question is now whether we may t rea t (34) as a (n-k) dimensional 
probability statement on y. We will prove that, in a sense, we may. 
The crucial aspect of the kind probability statement we need, is that it leads 
to proper updates of evidence f or the models when adding new data. 
Bayes' formula requires that 
p(y iM)=p(y |y .M)p(y IM) 
n n n-l n-l (39) 
as 
p(y ly . .MWoar)"1 . |X X M X ' X j exp(-l/2(y'My-y M v )/<r2)(39a) 
n n - l ^' n-l n- l ' ' n n'J n-l n-l n-l 
this obviously cannot be true in the normal sense. This is not amazing as, if 
(39a) would hold for all recursions from k, formula (1) would result with the 
dependency on the starting values. 
The solution is to consider (39) backwards. We require that a probability 
statement on y y is a proper combination of all forecast statements for 
the n elements: 
p(y |M)=n
 v{p(y |y ,M)p(y |M)} 
n \m) n-m m — m 
(40) 
So, as m=n-l, a mixture of the n forecasts to be made by deleting all y's 
once. Not surprising, we will base the proper mixture on the Binet-Cauchy 
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theorem. 
In the exponential term, we get (divided by o- ) for the right hand side 
im) m n - p - l m m m m m m n - p - l n-p n-p 
so (40) holds exactly in this respect. 
The power of <r obviously fulfills its requirement. The remaining term of 
interest is 
n (lx* x |/|x'x|)cn-i fn (lx' x l/lx* x |)cn-z] (4i) 
<n-l€n> ' n-1 n-1' ' ' ^<n-2€n-l> ' n-2 n-21 ' n-1 n-1' J 
with 
c = |X' X l/IX'Xl (n-p)"1 and c = |X' X l/IX* X I. 
n-1 ' n-1 n-11 ' ' v n-2 ' n-2 n-2' ' n-1 n-11 
Substituting the approximation 
Tn-l€n> n-1 n-1 
(42) 
in (41) and using (27) we derive the following "identity" 
exp(ln(n) + ln(n-p) + (n-k-l)ün(n-l) + ln(n-l-p))). (43) 
Fortunately (43) is (for large n) approximately equal to 
exp((n-k)(ln(n)+ln(n-p)) (44) 
which gives us our desired result (40). 
11. Some philosophical questions and simulations 
What does our "Fair Bayes Factor" mean? We hope of course that it is a Bayes 
factor in the traditional sense, to be interpreted as posterior odds for unit 
prior odds. The argument that it can't be that because this would contradict 
Bayes Factors based on informative priors is invalid: all probability 
statements depend on information, and the idea is that we excluded a part of 
the prior information on parameters. Not all prior information, as "prior odds 
being unity" implies some prior ideas, as will become clear in the sequel. 
If only some information is deleted, our Bayes Factor should give valid, 
though not fully efficiënt answers if there is an informative prior. And the 
least one can hope is that the results are better than those of other criteria 
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using the same information. 
To check this, we performed some simulation studies. It is not simple, 
however, to define a simulation experiment that shows what question is 
answered. The central message of the criteria seems to be the update message: 
if a priori both models are equally likely, adding the forecasts updates the 
probabilities. The problem is to define a situation where "equally likely" has 
a specific meaning. To solve this we used is a presample: 
We generate drawings from two different models, using proper priors. We use a 
2 2 
small dataset (size ns) and compute for any case s and s . Next we select 0 1 
2 2 
pairs of cases coming from different models with equal ratios s / s . Thus we 
obtain a prior situation with equal probabilities that the models are correct, 
in a way that is the same for all criteria depending on this ratio, that is 
for almost all criteria including the F test . 
Next we generate new data for all selected models, and obtain new ratios. The 
question is now whether criteria computed from these new ratio are suited to 
calculate posterior probabilities for the right model. For each criterion we 
calculate the loglikelihood score 
EM (lnp(M ))+J^ (InpCM )) 
1 2 
The cri teria we compared are Schwarz, Akaike, p(F) which is the classical "p 
value for which the F test just rejects the null, and the two extremes of our 
prediction criteria: Pred(k) based on training samples of minimal size and 
Pred(n-l) based on training samples of maximal size. Also we looked at the 
optimal discrimination function of the format 
p(y|Mo) 
=c. 
p(y|Mx) 
2 S 0 
2 S 1 
-b 
for varying c and b. 
The answers appears to be a mixed success. Only the hypothesis b=(n-k)/2 is 
confirmed. The optimal value for c and the relative performance of the 
criteria depends on the priors, on the size of the starting set and (less so) 
on the size of the sample. One can distinguish three situations: 
A. Nested models 
In nested models, M being the small model and M the model with more 
2 2 
parameters, s / s is close to unity if M is true. The distribution of the 
rat io if M is true depends on the situation. One can get them close to unity 
(around 0.9, say) either by using large presamples (the rat io under M is than 
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Fig 1. P(M1) as dependent on the ratio S /S according to five criteria 
n=50, k0=2, kl=3 
0 " H — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — i — : — r 
0.63 0.735 0.84 0.945 
S21/S20 
- 3 -
Pred(n-1) 
P(F) 
Schwarz 
- ö -
Akaike 
X 
Pred(k) 
so strongly concentrated that only the small percentage of values near 1 are 
selected), or by specifying a prior with a low signal-to-noise ratio. With the 
lat ter we mean, rewriting the model as 
y = X p + X y + u with X'X = 0 and X'X diagonal, J
 <T 1 o i i i 6 
that [2 y var(x )]/(n-k) is small compared to <r . In our simulations we used 
small presamples and manipulated Var(x ) to obtain different situations. 
Fig 1 makes clear (for one specific situation) what happens. The criteria 
simply differ with respect to the penalties they impose on the large model. In 
this case (and other cases differ little) in decreasing order of penalties 
Pred(k), Schwarz, Pred(n-l), Akaike, p(F). 
If the ratio under M tends to be small, high penalties tend to win. In the 
first part of table 3 (corresponding with fig 1) this is the case. Schwarz and 
Pred(k) win, Pred(k) just losing by a bad score if M is true (for even lower 
ratios, Pred(k) would win). The looser is p(F), corresponding with the well 
known effect that the interpretation of the classical error of the f irs t kind 
as evidence against the null (which is formally not justified, but quite 
natural) grossly tends to overestimate this evidence. 
The second part of table 3 shows that for n=100 the results are similar, but 
the scores get better (as to the interpretation of the scores: the -22.07 for 
Pred(k) corresponds with an expected score for 100 probability statements 
having a probability of 947. of being right and saying so). 
In the third part of table 3, the mean ratio under M is manipulated to be 
much larger. Now the discrimination is much harder (the scores are worse) and 
low penalties win. That is to say: Pred(n-l) and Akaike do, the p(F) criterion 
still looses by a bad score if M is true, and its overall score is worse than 
a fifty-fifty gamble (giving a certain score of 100.1n(0.5) = -69.31). But the 
lat ter is also t rue for Pred(k) by its horrible score if M is true, caused by 
underestimating the probability of this being the case. 
Minimax considerations seem to advocate Pred(n-l), on the other hand it is 
clear that choosing the wrong model is considerably worse when the models 
differ a lot, so with other criteria Schwarz and Pred(k) might be the winners. 
We also performed studies with kl much larger, but the conclusions remained 
the same. 
Table 4 concerns a much easier situation: the choice between two (correlated) 
explanatory variables. Here the difference in penalties is irrelevant. 
Discrimination between the models is good (-36.26 corresponds to a 88% score), 
the difference between the criteria is irrelevant, but the prediction criteria 
saying that one may simply raise the ratio of residual sums of squares to the 
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power (n-k)/2 to obtain odds is an elegant outcome. That even the F test 
scores well is of little relevance: it is not applicable. 
For nonnested models with different degrees of freedom, the scores also tend 
to be good for all criteria, the winner depending on the circumstances. 
So, firm conclusions are difficult to draw, especially for non-nested models. 
The main conclusions are that everything is better than the F-test, and that 
further thinking is required about the questions we want to answer. 
Appendix A. The dis t r ibut ion of the residuals. 
If X is an arbitrary training sample of size m of X and X the remainder of 
X, we can write 
M = I - X f X ' x r V = I -
X 
(X'X)" X X 
1 2 
i -x (x'xrbrxtx'xrV 
1 1 1 2 
-Xo(X*X)_1X' I - X ( X ' X f V . 
" • 2 i 2 2 J 
M M 
11 12 
LM M . 
L
 21 22 J 
Equation (6) written (explicitly) as a normal distribution in y„ (y ) gives 
2 >m 
y = N(-M_ 1 M y , <r2 M_1). 
J2 22 21 "V 22 
(1) 
As (1) and (6) are essentially the same, we derive the following identity 
|M I exp(-y'M M_1M y/<r2) *= |X'X l/IX'Xl exp((y'M y - y'M y )/<r2). (2) 
1
 22' K ;i i2 22 2ri ' ï i 1 1 ' K Ji ri Ji ïri 
with M = I - X (X'X )~X'. A simple matrix theorem (see e.g. Judge...), 
if A, D are singular matrices of order m, n and B, C are (m x n) and (m x n) 
matrices, respectively, then 
|A| |D + CA-1B| = ]D| |A + BD-1C|, (3) 
applied with A = X'X, B = X', C = X and D = I learns 
|M22| - |x;x |/|x'x| (4) 
And thus 
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y'M y - y'M y - y'M M M y . (5) 
•'ï r i Ji ï r i Ji 12 22 2 r i 
Our (n-p) dimensional probability statement would look something like 
(oar)"(n"p)/2 exp(-y*My/2<r2). (6) 
Now y'My can be written as 
y'My = y'M y + y'M y + y'M y + y'M y (7) 
J J Ji i r i J2 2 r i Ji i2J2 J2 zrz 
- (y + M_1M y )'M (y + M~*M y ) + y'(M - M M_1M )y 
J2 22 2 r i 22 J2 22 2 r i Jl 11 12 22 21 ' l 
= (y + M_1M y )'M (y + M-1M y ) + y'M y 
" 2 22 2 r i 22 J2 22 2 r i J1 ïri. 
So (6) corresponds with a distribution of y |y which is (n-m) dimensional 
normal with variance M~ and expectation -M~ M y multiplied by a factor 
22 r 22 2 r i r J 
exp(-y'M y /2o* ). In other words 
Pn-k ( y ) = Cl P (y2lyi}- ( 8 ) 
Appendix B. Heurist ic proof t ha t the the factor T c lnc differs l i tt le 
e
 ^(k) k k 
among models 
In both models the c are N = . very small positive weights summing to 1 
with, in most cases, only moderate variation. 
One possibility to get some further understanding of the size of £. .c lnc is 
the following: 
Imagine the c ordered by size (descending) on intervals numbered 1...N. 
Approximate the resulting discrete density by its continuous counterpart, 
assuming a truncated exponential distribution: 
c s Xe"X k /( l-e"X N) k=l...N 
k 
so the facts that they are descending and summing to unity have been 
incorporated. Variation among distributions of c can be represented now as 
variations in NA. Let a be the percentage of c covering 907. of the 
probability. A rather extreme case is a=0.1: the largest 107. of the c sum to 
0.9. The other reasonable extreme is a=0.8, meaning very little variation 
among the c . 
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As is easily shown, with each value of a there corresponds a value of AN, 
while 
Eünc ) - T c lnc = -ln(l-e~XN) + InA - (l-(l+AN)e~*N)/(l-e"AN) 
k *"<k> k k 
0.60.70.8 
3.42.51.51 
.38 .23 .09 
The last line shows that for extreme differences between the conditioning of 
the X matrices a difference of 2 points in T c ln(c ), so of 1 point in the 
"(k) k k 
loglikelihood (26), may occur (the value of N is equal among models). In most 
cases only some decimals difference will occur. Note that one can estimate the 
necessary adjustment by taking samples of size k from the X matrices. 
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